Francisco Cariño vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-14752 – Case Digest

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On April 28, 1952, being an alleged member of NPA & HUKBALAHAP, the accused was charged with the crime of rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and disrupting its activities. The RTC and CA found that the accused was an accomplice for the Crime of Rebellion or Insurrection.


Whether Cariño is an Accomplice for the Crime of Rebellion or Insurrection.


No, Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices, thus:

ART. 18. Accomplices. — Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in article , cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. So that there are two elements required, in accordance with the definition of the term accomplice given in the Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice to a criminal act, namely, that he take part in the execution of the crime by previous and simultaneous acts and that he intend by said acts to commit or take part in the execution of the crime.


ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers, or prerogatives.

In the case at bar the appellant did not take up arms against the Government. Neither was he a member of the Hukbalahap organization. The Court of Appeals also found that he did not openly take part in the commission of the crime above defined by any other act without which said crime would not have been committed. For the foregoing considerations, we declare that the guilt of appellant as an accomplice in the crime of rebellion or insurrection as charged in the information has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, his supposed acts not having been shown to be acts of direct cooperation in the execution of the crime, nor have they been introduced by a criminal intent, nor were they shown to be sufficiently efficacious to make appellant guilty as accomplice in the crime charged.