Susano Amor vs. Fernando Jugo, et al. | G.R. No. L-922, December 3, 1946

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Republic of the Philippines


G.R. No. L-922 | December 3, 1946

SUSANO AMOR, petitioner,
FERNANDO JUGO, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and SHIU CHE KONG (alias TIU TIONG IU), respondents.

Jose Belmonte for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Sycip and Quisumbing for respondent Shiu Che Kong.


In a detainer action brought by petitioner against respondent Shiu Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong Iu and Francisco Gonzales, Judgment was rendered by the court of First Instance of Manila on appeal, the dispositive part of which reads thus:

El demando Shiu Che Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong Iu y el demandante manifestaronal Juzgado que enterellos dos acababan de tener un arreglo amistoso, sin es pecificario ; pero para evitar que las partes vuelvan a litogar sobre la misma cuestion, y sin perjuico de cualqeir arregllo legal que las partes pudieran tener, el Juzgado dicta decision, condenando a los demandalos a restituir al demandemante la casa en cuestion No. 2248 (piso bajo), Avenida Rizal, Manila; se demandado Shiu Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong lu a pagar al demanlos acquileres de dicha case a razon de CIENTO CUARENTA PESOS (140.00 al mes por el tiempo que vaya venciedo despuses de Julio devolviendo a este el exceso de lo que habia recibido desde Marzo a Julio, inclusive, de 1945, mas sus intereses legales; se condena al demandado Shiu Kong alias Tiu Tiong Iu a pagar al demadante los alquileres de dicha casa a razon de CIENTO CUARENTA PESOS (140.00) al mes por el tiempo quevaya venciedo despues de Julio de 1945 hasta la restitucion completa de dicha casa al demandante; se ordena al demandado Francisco Gonzales a no inmiscuirse en la possession y disporcion de dicha casa al demandados a pagar las costas en ambas instancias. (Exhibit A.)

Only Francisco Gonzales affirmed it (Exhibit C). On August 2, 1946, a motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court (Exhibit C-1 ). On August 5, petitioner moved for execution of the judgment which the respondent court granted the following day (Exhibit D). On August 10, respondent Tiu Tiong Iu moved for a stay of execution of the judgment, on the ground (1) that there had been a contract of lease on the premises involved in the action between him and the petitioner; (2) that after making him believe that he could continue occupying the premises, petitioner was estopped from asking for execution of the judgment; (3) that the judgment, the execution of which was prayed for, by its terms could not be executed against him; (4) that the judgment had already been executed, for the contract of lease referred to had in effect restored to petitioner the possession of the premises (Exhibit F). It clearly appears that the real purpose of the motion was not to stay execution of the judgment but to quash it. The motion was objected to by petitioner (Exhibit G). On August 20, the respondent court denied the writ of execution prayed for by petitioner (Exhibit H), which had already been granted on August 6 (Exhibit D). The motion submitted to the respondent court for decision was to stay execution of the judgment (should be to quash the writ of execution), but the order denying the execution was tantamount to granting the stay of execution of the judgment (should be to quashing the writ of execution), prayed for by respondent Tiu Tiong Iu, on the ground that there was a contractual relation of landlord and tenant between petitioner and respondent Tiu Tiong Iu (Exhibit H). A motion for reconsideration of the preceding order (Exhibit I) was denied (Exhibit L).

The petition filed in this special civil action prays for a writ to compel the respondent court to issue a writ for the execution of the judgment, the issuance of which it had denied or the quashal or stay of which it had ordered.

The alleged settlement of the detainer case between respondent Tiu Tiong Iu and petitioner is disputed by the latter who claims that what was settled or accepted by him was the payment of rental to him every month instead of its deposit into court during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioner’s claim is corroborated by his refusal to accept the payment of the rental for the month of August after learning of the denial by this Court of appellant’s motion for reconsideration on August 2, 1946. If the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu had in fact entered into a contract of lease with the petitioner, the former should have bared it to the trial court or should have set up his defense and presented evidence in support thereof, when the latter objected to the dismissal of the case as to said respondent. Be that as it may, the fact remains that respondent Tiu Tiong Iu and his co-defendant Francisco Gonzales were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, among other things, to vacate the premises then occupied by the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu. Only Francisco Gonzales appealed from the judgment. This Court affirmed it. The judgment was final and executory as to the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu even before its affirmance by this court, because he did not appeal therefrom.

The respondent court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it or order its stay, for, as general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable (Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil., 4; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil., 276; Molina vs. De la Riva, 8 Phil., 569; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil., 588; Flor Mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil., 809; Chua A.H. Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil., 624); or when it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court (Yulo and Sajo vs. Powell, 36., 732); or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority (Wolfson vs. Del Rosario and Fajardo, 76 Phil., 143; Viuda de Dimayuga vs. Raymundo and Nable, 42 Official Gazette, 2121). None of these circumstances is present in the judgment sought to be executed. The judgment is clear, specific and definitive. And with more compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such writ, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment had been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any matter decided on appeal, or give other or further relief, or assume supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court. (Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333; Cabigao and Izquierdo vs. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 Phil., 182; Wolfson vs. Del Rosario and Fajardo, supra; Philippine Trust Co. vs. Santamaria and F. M. Yaptico & Co., 53 Phil., 463.).

The phrase “sin perjuicio de cualquier arreglo legal que las partes pudieran tener,” found in the judgment under consideration, does not warrant an inference that there had been a contract, understanding or settlement between petitioner and respondent Tiu Tiong Iu which created between them the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is more of a future than a past or previous understanding. Respondent Tiu Tiong Iu insists that it was an understanding had before the trial of the case in the respondent court. His failure to persist in his motion to have the case dismissed as to him based on that understanding deprives him of the right to rely thereon. If the alleged understanding had been entered into before the trial of the case, the rule laid down in Chua A. H. Lee vs. Mapa, supra, invoked by respondent Tiu Tiong Iu, is inapplicable, because the understanding is not subsequent to the judgment, the trial court disregarded it, and the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu did not appeal from such finding to have it reversed.

There being no legal or equitable ground upon which a refusal to issue a writ of execution, or a quashal on the execution, or a stay of execution, of the judgment rendered in the detainer case against the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu may be predicated, the order of the respondent court denying the issuance of the writ of execution, or quashing it or directing its stay after it had been issued, is clearly illegal.

The respondent court is directed to issue the writ of execution as prayed for by petitioner, with costs against the respondent Tiu Tiong Iu.

Moran, Bengzon, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Briones and Tuason, JJ., concur.